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When should labor contracts be nominal?




This paper proposes a theory of when labor contract should be nominal or, instead, indexed. We find that,
contracts should be indexed if prices are difficult to forecast and nominal otherwise. We use a principal-
agent model developed by Jovanovic and Ueda (1997), with moral hazard, renegotiation, and where a
signal (the nominal value of the sales of the agent) is observed before renegotiation takes place. We show
that their result, that the optimal contract is nominal when agents must choose pure strategies, is robust to
the case where agents can choose mixed strategies in the sense that, for certain parameters, the optimal
contract is still nominal. For other parameters, however, we show that the optimal contract is indexed.
Our findings are consistent with two empirical regularities. First prices are more volatile with higher in-
flation and, second, countries with high inflation tend to have indexed contracts. Our theory suggests that
it is because prices are difficult to forecast in high inflation countries that contracts are indexed.
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In this paper, we build on a model proposed by Jovanovic and Ueda (1997) (JU) to
provide an explanation for the fact that we observe both nominal and indexed labor
contracts. We show that the theory is consistent with the empirical evidence that indexed
contracts are more prevalent in high inﬂation countries than in low inﬂation ones.
JU propose an explanation for why we observe nominal contract. They use a principal-
agent model with moral hazard, renegotiation and a signal which is observed after the
agent made his eﬀort decision but before renegotiation takes place. The signal is the
nominal value of the sales of the agent. They assume that the agent follows a pure strat-
egy in choosing his eﬀort level and show that although contract could depend on the real
amount of sales of the agent (it could be indexed) it will, in fact, depend only on the
signal (the contract is nominal). This is because indexed contracts are not renegotiation-
proof. The intuition for this goes as follows. Since the agent follows a pure strategy, the
principal can infer, in equilibrium, the eﬀort level that has been chosen. Assume that the
principal oﬀers an indexed contract. At the renegotiation stage, since the eﬀort is sunk,
the principal can oﬀer a new contract that is independent of the real amount of sales. The
agent, being risk-averse, will prefer such a contract, and so does the principal because
it reduces her wage bill. Nominal contracts, on the other hand, are renegotiation-proof
because they depend only on the signal which is observed before renegotiation takes
place.
We modify JU’s model and allow the agent to choose his eﬀort level according to
a mixed strategy. Under this hypothesis both nominal and indexed contracts can be
renegotiation-proof because with mixed strategies the principal is not able to infer the
agent’s eﬀort level anymore. We consider which type of contract is best for diﬀerent
parameter values and show that the contract will be indexed if the signal doesn’t provide
much information and will be nominal otherwise. The intuition for this result is that
if the signal is suﬃciently informative, it is not very expensive to provide incentives for
the agent to choose the eﬀort level preferred by the principal. The nominal value of
sales is a good approximation to the real amount of sales which is an indication of the
agents eﬀort. If the signal is not good, the cost becomes very high because the signal
doesn’t reveal much about the agent’s eﬀort. Thus the principal prefers to oﬀer an index
2contract that provides incentives at a lower cost.
Since the principal cares about the real amount of sales, the nominal value is most
informative when prices are easy to forecast; so in this case contract should be nomi-
nal. On the other hand, when prices are diﬃcult to forecast, which makes the signal
not very informative, contracts should be indexed. This corresponds to our intuition
and is consistent with two empirical regularities. First, there is an important literature
(see Cukierman (1984) and the references therein) showing that higher inﬂation is ac-
companied by more volatile prices or, in other words, prices that are more diﬃcult to
predict. Second, countries with high inﬂation tend to have indexed contracts. Azariadis
(1978) notes that: “Wage escalation is [...] widespread in countries which have recently
experienced substantial inﬂationary episodes.”2 For the postwar United-States, Holland
(1995) has similar results. In particular, he ﬁnds that increases in inﬂation precede in-
creases in wage indexation. In the light of these observations, our model suggests that
t h er e a s o nh i g hi n ﬂation countries tend to have indexed contracts is because prices in
these countries are diﬃcult to forecast.
The literature related to our paper is fairly small. JU indicate that two reasons have
been suggested for why contracts are nominal: “The price level cannot be observed in
time (Lucas 1972) or is costly to incorporate into a contract (Dye 1981).” We are not
aware of a paper that speciﬁcally considers the circumstances under which contracts
should be nominal or indexed.
Azariadis-Cooper (1985a,b) and Cooper (1990) investigate economies for which there
can be equilibria with nominal contracts as well as equilibria with indexed contracts.
They incorporate ideas from the implicit contract literature (Azariadis (1975), Baily(1974))
into an overlapping generation model. Risk averse consumers whose consumption is risky
when they are old can obtain insurance from risk neutral speculators who can sell them
nominal claims. Azariadis-Cooper (1985a) show that the market for nominal claims will
be open if consumers are suﬃciently risk averse, and that the resulting equilibrium is
constrained-optimal. Azariadis-Cooper (1985b) and Cooper (1990) introduce a govern-
ment who prints money to ﬁnance its consumption and show that there are multiple
equilibria. In particular, there is an equilibrium with nominal contracts if government
2See also the references in his paper.
3policy is not “too variable”. Intuitively, this result is similar to ours. Freeman and
Tabellini (1998) present a model in which nominal contracts can be optimal under cer-
tain assumptions. However they do not discuss when indexed or nominal contracts should
be preferred. There is a literature concerned with the optimal degree of indexation of
contracts (Gray (1976), Fischer(1977)) but in these models the form of the contract is
given and is not derived from ﬁrst principles.
The rest of the paper is built as follows. In section 2 we describe the model. Then,
in section 3, we present the problem of the principal. We ﬁnd it convenient to consider
three separate cases, the case when agents work hard with probability one, the case when
they work hard with probability zero, and the case when they follow a mixed strategy.
By comparing the utility of the principal in each case, we can determine the contract
that will be chosen. In section 4 we present our main theorem and, in section 5, discuss
when the principal wants to provide incentives for the agents to work hard with strictly
positive probability. Section 6 concludes.
42 The model
2.1 Preferences
The presentation of the model follows closely that of JU. We consider the case of an
individual, the principal, who faces the problem of giving another individual, the agent,
the incentive to make some work eﬀort. The principal cannot observe the agent’s eﬀort
but only a signal s and then the output y.T h e l e v e l o f e ﬀort inﬂuences the level of
output through the probability of its occurence, Fe(y) ≡ prob(output ≤ y|eﬀort = e).
The agent has preferences over real income w ∈ R and eﬀort e ≥ 0 which can
be represented by an additively separable utility function U(w,e)=U(w) − Ψ(e).
The function U is deﬁned on (−∞,∞), is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and
limw→−∞ U(w)=−∞, limw→∞ U(w)=∞ 3. We impose no limits on the amount the
principal can promise the agent. The function Ψ : R+ → R+ denotes the cost of exerting
ap a r t i c u l a re ﬀort. Finally, we let w denote the reservation wage utility of the agent and
deﬁne u = U(w) the corresponding utility level.
The principal is risk neutral and she maximizes the diﬀerence between her expected
revenue and her expected wage bill. We assume that the utility of the principal is zero
if she chooses not to hire the agent.
2.2 Signals
The signal is the nominal value of the sales of the agent s = Py,w h e r eP is the price
level. The price level is eventually known by the principal before consumption takes
place. This allows for the possibility of indexed contracts. Given a signal and an eﬀort
level, the price is distributed according to a non degenerate density function g(P|s,e).
Hence, upon observing a high signal, the principal does not know if the amount of sales
was good and the price was low or if the amount of sales was bad and the price high.
3These assumptions are those made in Fudenberg and Tirole (1990)(FT) and allow a direct use of
their theorems. As noted in their paper, most results hold for the case where the function U is bounded
below which allows limited liability for the agent.
52.3 The contract space
Deﬁnition 2.1. An admissible compensation scheme is denoted by c(e) and speciﬁes the
wage w(P,s,e) as a function of the signal s and price P = s/y, for each announced level
of eﬀort e.
Deﬁnition 2.2. An admissible contract, denoted by c, is a menu of admissible compen-
sation scheme, one for each level of eﬀort.
We let C denote the set of admissible contracts. The agent chooses an admissible
compensation scheme from the contract oﬀered by the principal. The compensation
scheme speciﬁes the income received by the agent for a given signal and a given state.
Hence if the signal is s, the price is P = s/y and the announced eﬀort level is e,t h e n
t h ei n c o m er e c e i v e di sw(P,s,e). Because of strict concavity, each diﬀerent level of
income corresponds to a unique level of utility for the agent. Hence, we can think of
a compensation scheme as specifying a level of utility, U(w(P,s,e)) for each signal and
price observed and each announced level of eﬀort. Abusing notation, we write the level
of utility as U(P,s,e).
The justiﬁcation for our choice of C as the contract space are as in FT. On the one
hand, letting the principal oﬀer admissible compensation schemes that are conditional
on the eﬀort level announced by the agent allows her to screen the agent. On the other
hand, we can appeal to the revelation principal to justify the use of a direct revelation
mechanism where the agent report truthfully his eﬀort level.
Deﬁnition 2.3. We call a contract nominal if w(P,s,e)=w(s,e) for all P,a n di n d e x e d
otherwise.
A contract is nominal if the compensation schemes depend only on the signal and the
announced level of eﬀort. If w(P,s,e) 6= w(P 0,s,e),f o rs o m eP and P0,t h ec o m p e n s a t i o n
schemes depend also on the real outcome y = s/P. Given the signal, learning the level
of prices is equivalent to learning the real outcome. Hence if w(P,s,e) 6= w(P0,s,e),f o r
some P and P0, we can say that the compensation scheme depends both on the signal
and on the price level, i.e. on the real output level y, and we call it an indexed contract.
62.4 Game and strategies
The extensive form of the game is as follows. First the principal oﬀers the agent a
contract. If it is refused, the agent receives utility u and the principal can not oﬀer
another contract. Next, if the contract has been accepted, the agent chooses an eﬀort
strategy and determines the eﬀort level. After the eﬀort has been made, the signal is
observed. Then, at the renegotiation stage the principal can choose to oﬀer the agent a
new contract. If it is not accepted the original contract remains valid and the principal
can not oﬀer another one. Next, the agent chooses a compensation scheme from the
feasible contract. Finally the outcome of the project is observed and payments are
made. We include the time line in the Appendix.
Deﬁnition 2.4. A contract is renegotiation-proof if, given the realized signal, there is
no other contract that Pareto dominates it at the renegotiation stage.
A strategy for the agent is a function with domain R+ ×Cand range [0,1].G i v e n
an admissible contract, the agent chooses a probability function µ : R+ → [0,1] which
assigns probability µ(e) of exerting eﬀort level e and
R ∞
0 µ(e)de = 1.
A strategy for the principal is a choice of a renegotiation-proof contract, given the
strategy of the agent. We study the problem of the principal in the next section.
3 The principal’s problem
In the remainder of the paper we consider the case where there are two possible sig-
nals, H and L as well as two levels of real outcomes yH and yL and two levels of
eﬀort e and e.W e a s s u m e H>L , yH >y L and e>e . The distribution func-
tions become discrete probability measures, but we keep the same notation. Therefore,
Fe(σ) ≡ prob(s = σ|e) for σ ∈ {H,L}. For simplicity, we abuse notation and write
g(yH|s,e)=g(s/yH|s,e) ≡ prob(P = s/yH|s,e). Therefore we use g interchangeably to
denote the probability measure for the real output and for the price level4.M o r e o v e rw e
use g(y|e)=
P
s g(y|s,e)Fe(s) as the probability of being in state y if the agent chose a
4We can do this because given P and s we know the real output level y = s/P and given y and s we
also know the price level P = s/y.
7level of eﬀort e.T h ec o s to fe ﬀort function Ψ is such that Ψ(e)=0and Ψ(e)=Ψ > 0.
To ﬁx ideas, consider the following example. Assume the price level P can take
three values, P1 <P 2 <P 3 and the real amount y o fs a l e si se i t h e ryH or yL.L e t
P1yH = P2yL = L, P2yH = P3yL = H and assume that prob(P = P3 and y = yH)=
prob(P = P1 and y = yL)=0 . Hence, upon observing a high signal, the principal does
not know if the amount of sales was good and the price was low or if the amount of sales
was bad and the price medium.
Assumption 3.1. Fe(H) >F e(H) and g(yH|H,e) >g (yH|H,e).
The ﬁrst inequality says that the high signal is more likely to occur if the high eﬀort
has been chosen, while the second says that conditional on the high signal, the good
state is more likely when the high eﬀort has been chosen. Notice that, from probability
theory, g(yH|e)=Fe(H)g(yH|H,e)+Fe(L)g(yH|H,e), e ∈ {e,e}, so our assumptions
imply g(yH|e) >g (yL|e).
We now describe the problem of the principal when she wants to induce eﬀort with a
strictly positive probability. Let µ denote the probability with which the agent chooses
the high eﬀort. We let RP be the set of renegotiation-proof contracts. These are the
contract that can not be Pareto-improved upon at the renegotiation stage. A point in
RP is formed of a probability µ ∈ [0,1] and of eight promised utility levels {U(y,s,e)}
for each s ∈ {H,L},y∈ {yH,y L} and e ∈ {e,e}. Hence, we can write RP as:
RP =
(
µ,{U(y,s,e)} for all s,y,e such that:
{U(y,s,e)} for all s,y,e, is renegociation-proof
)
.
We will characterize such contracts below.















subject to the following constraints5
(a) the ex-ante incentive compatibility constraint (IC),
5The constraints are written explicitly in the appendix.
8(b) the individual rationality constraint (IR),
(c) the fact that µ must be a best response for the agent and
(d) the contract is renegotiation-proof.
As stated previously, the objective function of the principal is the expected revenue
minus the expected wage bill. The ex-ante incentive compatibility constraint says that
the agent must get at least as much utility from choosing the high eﬀort than from choos-
ing the low eﬀort and exactly the same utility if he randomizes. The other constraints
are standard.
Instead of trying to solve this problem directly, it will prove useful to consider two
diﬀerent cases, µ = 1 and µ ∈ (0,1).I ti sa l s ou s e f u lt oﬁnd the utility of the principal
when she doesn’t provide any incentives for the agent to work hard, so we will also look
at the case where µ =0 . As we show below, the contract takes, in each of these cases, a
simple form. Then, for a given set of parameters, we can compare the value the principal
gets from the contract in each case and determine which one is best for her.
3.1 Case I: µ =0
Here, the principal does not provide the agent with any incentive to exert eﬀort, thus
the wage oﬀered is the reservation wage w and the utility of the principal, denoted V0,
is given by
V0 = yL + g(yL|e)∆ − w,
where ∆ ≡ yH − yL.
This contract is renegotiation-proof.
3.2 Case II: µ = 1
Now the principal wants the agent to always exert high eﬀort. We know from the
renegotiation-proofness condition that U(y,H,e)=U(H) and U(y,L,e)=U(L) for all
y,a n dU(s,y,e)=u for all s and y. The intuition is that when µ = 1, any contract
that has U(yH,s,e) 6= U(yL,s,e),f o rs o m es and e, is not renegotiation-proof. Since the
9utility levels oﬀered in this contract are independent of the real amount of sales of the
agent y, we call it a nominal contract. Notice that, since the signal is observed before
renegotiation takes place, nominal contract are renegotiation-proof.














Under this contract, the agent receives an amount that depends on the signal, the
nominal value of his sales, but not on the real amount of those sales, and his expected
utility is u + Ψ.N o t et h a tU(H) − U(L) increases with Ψ and decreases with Fe(H) −
Fe(H). The payoﬀ of the agent from oﬀering this contract will be denoted by V1 and is
given by
V1 = yL + g(yH|e)∆ − W1,
where W1 = Fe(H)w(H)+( 1 − Fe(H))w(L) is the expected wage bill of the principal
under this contract. w(s) is such that U(w(s)) = U(s) for s ∈ {H,L} .
The following technical lemma will be used in the proof of our main theorem. All
proofs are in the appendix.
Lemma 3.2. Given Fe(H), W1 −→ ∞ as Fe(H) −→ Fe(H).
3.3 Case III: µ ∈ (0,1)
In this case, the contract oﬀered by the principal looks a lot like the one derived by
FT. It is a little more complicated because we have a signal. However, it is easy to
prove that if the signal is uncorrelated with the real outcome, the contracts in our model
and in FT are exactly the same. For a given signal, and a given µ, the form of the
renegotiation-proof contract is given by lemma 2.1 (p. 1284) in FT. We restate it here,
using our notation.
10Lemma 3.3. (FT, Lemma 2.1) Given a signal s,i fc = {U(yH,s,e),U(yL,s,e)}e∈{e,e}
is a renegotiation-proof contract for distribution µ,t h e n
either
g(yH|e)U(yH,s,e)+g(yL|e)U(yL,s,e) >g (yH|e)U(yH,s,e)+g(yL|e)U(yL,s,e)
so that, at the renegotiation stage, the expected utility of an agent who chose low eﬀort
is strictly higher than the expected utility of an agent who chose high eﬀort,
or the following three conditions hold:
1. U(yH,s,e)=U(yL,s,e)=u,
2. U(yH,s,e) ≥ U(yL,s,e),
3. g(yH|s,e)U(yH,s,e)+g(yL|s,e)U(yL,s,e)=g(yH|s,e)U(yH,s,e)+g(yL|s,e)U(yL,s,e).
so that, at the renegotiation stage, the incentive compatibility constraint is binding for
agents who chose low eﬀort.
Under the ﬁrst type of contracts, an agent will never choose to work hard, so we
consider only the second type of contracts. Since the conditions (1) to (3) must hold for
any signal s,w eh a v ei np a r t i c u l a rt h a tU(y,H,e)=U(y,L,e)=u,f o rs ∈ {H,L}.T ob e
consistent with FT, we call condition (3) the interim incentive compatibility constraints.
Notice that the last constraints do not include the cost of exerting high eﬀort since it is
sunk at the renegotiation stage.
When there is no signal, as in FT, the constraint set yields a singleton, but it is not
true here. In this case, we know that four constraint must hold with equality, the interim
incentive compatibility constraint, for each signal, the ex-ante incentive compatibility
constraint and the individual rationality constraint. Using lemma 3.3 , we can see that
the last two constraints are equivalent and we are left with:
u = g(yH|H,e)U(yH,H,e)+g(yL|H,e)U(yL,H,e),
u = g(yH|L,e)U(yH,L,e)+g(yL|H,e)U(yL,L,e),
Ψ + u = Fe(H)[g(yH|H,e)U(yH,H,e)+g(yL|H,e)U(yL,H,e)] +
Fe(L)[g(yH|L,e)U(yL,L,e)+g(yL|L,e)U(yL,L,e)].
11These three equations in four unknowns give us a family of solution that we can
parameterize by one of the unknowns. We let Z = U(yH,L,e) a n dt h e ne x p r e s sa l lt h e



















The expression for χ(Z) is given in the appendix, where we also show how to obtain µ
as a function of Z. The utility levels oﬀered in this contract depend both on the signal
and the real amount of sale. Given the nominal value of the sales, knowing the real
amount is equivalent to knowing the price level. Thus we can think of this contract as
depending on the signal and the level of prices. This is the reason why we call it an
indexed contract.
The problem of the principal then reduces to choosing the value of Z,d e n o t e dZ∗
that maximizes her proﬁt6.W el e tVµ(Z∗) denote the maximum value of the objective
function and we have
Vµ(Z




∗) − (1 − µ(Z
∗))Φ(u),
where, Wµ is the expected wage bill of the principal if the agent chooses the high
eﬀort. It is given by
Wµ = Fe(H)[g(yH|H,e)w(yH,H,e)+g(yL|H,e)w(yL,H,e)]
+Fe(L)[g(yH|L,e)w(yH,L,e)+g(yH|L,e)w(yH,L,e)]
Where w(y,s,e) is such that U(w(y,s,e)) = U(y,s,e). Notice that the value of yL
has no eﬀect on the type of contract the principal chooses to oﬀer. Thus we can assume
that yL is high enough so that the principal always prefers to oﬀer the agent a contract.
We will need two other lemma for the proof of our main theorem.
6This Z exists as the principal maximizes a continuous objective function over a compact set.
12Lemma 3.4. For any ε > 0,t h e r ee x i s t sµ>0 small enough such that Vµ − V0 < ε.
This lemma states that as µ tends to zero, the value to the principal of oﬀering an
indexed contract tends to something equal to V0 or lower.
Lemma 3.5. There exists ¯ ∆ > 0 big enough such that V1 >V 0 for all ∆ ≥ ¯ ∆.
∆ is the gross surplus from getting the high output. Therefore, for some high enough
surplus, the principal always prefers to have the agent working hard.
In this section, we have derived the value to the principal of oﬀering a contract for
three cases, 1) µ =0 ,2 )µ = 1,a n d3 )µ ∈ (0,1). For a given set of parameters, we
can determine the case in which the principal gets the highest utility and thus ﬁnd what
type of contract she will oﬀer.
4 Indexed vs. nominal contracts
In this section, we show our main result: the principal will choose indexed contracts
whenever the signal does not give much information on the eﬀort level chosen by the
agent and she will choose nominal contracts otherwise.
Let P denote a choice of parameters for our model, P = {w,Ψ,y H,y L}.L e tV σ
1 (P) denote
the value to the principal of a contract if µ = 1, P is the choice of parameters, and
Fe(H) − Fe(H)=σ. Note that, everything else being equal, V σ
1 (P) <Vσ0
1 (P) if σ0 > σ.
Theorem 4.1.
(1) Given P and any δ > 0. Assume that Fe(H),g(y|s,e),a l ly,s,g(yL|s,e),a l ls,a s
well as the diﬀerence g(yH|H,e) − g(yH|H,e) belong to [δ,1]. Then there is ²(P) > 0
such that:
If Fe(H) − Fe(H) <² (P) then Vµ >V 1.
(2) Let δ > 0. Assume that Fe(H)−Fe(H) belongs to [δ,1] and V δ
1 (P0) >V 0.T h e nt h e r e
is ²0(P0) > 0 such that:
If g(yH|H,e) − g(yH|H,e) <² 0(P0) then V1 >V µ.
13Notice that, under (1), the probabilities Fe(H) and g(y|s,e),a l ly,s, g(yL|s,e),a l ls,
and the diﬀerence g(yH|H,e) − g(yH|H,e) are not ﬁxed. As we change Fe(H) − Fe(H)
they are allowed to change as long as they remain in the interval [δ,1].As i m i l a rr e m a r k
hold for (2).
This theorem simply says that as Fe(H) −→ Fe(H), the cost for the principal of
oﬀering a nominal contract goes to inﬁnity. The restrictions we impose on the other
probability in our theorem assure that the cost of oﬀering an indexed contract is bounded.
This is why, as Fe(H)−Fe(H) gets smaller, the principal will eventually prefer to choose
an indexed contract. When the eﬀort level has little eﬀect on the realization of the signal
and the agent wage is tied to the signal only, the agent doesn’t have much incentive to
work hard since the increase in his expected income (and thus expected utility) is small.
In order to increase the incentives, the principal must increase the promised utility level
for a good signal. This gets more expensive as the eﬀect of eﬀort on the signal gets
smaller. The logic for the other case is very similar. As g(yH|H,e) −→ g(yH|H,e),
the cost for the principal of oﬀe r i n ga ni n d e x e dc o n t r a c tg o e st oi n ﬁnity, and thus the
principal chooses µ smaller and smaller and eventually, the principal prefers to choose
V1 rather than Vµ.
We want to show that this theorem supports the intuition that indexed contracts are
used when the signal does not provides much information and non-indexed contracts are





where F(H)=µFe(H)+( 1 − µ)Fe(H).B y d e ﬁnition, g(e|H) − µ is the marginal
information provided by the high signal. Hence, if this information is small enough,
Fe(H) − Fe(H) will be small and, by theorem 4.1, indexed contracts are preferred.





By deﬁnition, g(e|yH,H)−g(e|H) is the marginal information provided by the realization
of the good real sales, given that the high signal was observed. If this information is very
14small, the principal doesn’t expect to learn much by observing the real state and prefers
to propose a nominal contract.
We expect a nominal contract to be most informative in the case where prices are
easy to forecast. Indeed, if prices can be forecasted perfectly, the nominal signal reveals
all the relevant information. At the other extreme, the signal might be pure noise and
reveal absolutely no information. We thus expect to see nominal contracts when prices
are easy to forecast and indexed contracts when they are not. As mentioned earlier, the
conclusions of our model are remarkably consistent with two empirical regularities. First
it is recognized that higher inﬂation makes prices more diﬃcult to forecast and, second,
countries experiencing high inﬂation tend to have more indexed contracts. What our
model suggests is that indexed contracts are more prevalent in high inﬂation countries
because prices are hard to predict.
It is also interesting to note that our model suggests a way through which inﬂation
can have real eﬀects. Indeed, an increase in inﬂation may lead to a switch from nominal
contracts to indexed contracts. This in turn has an impact on the eﬀort exerted by the
agent. In our model, the expected output is lower under indexed contracts because the
agent chooses the high eﬀort with a smaller probability than under nominal contracts.
This however might not be true in a more general model. Consider, for example, a model
with three levels of eﬀort, high, medium and low. Suppose the level of eﬀort chosen with
probability 1 under nominal contract is the medium level. Under an indexed contract,
the agent might randomize between the three level of eﬀorts and consequently expected
output could be higher than under the nominal contract if high eﬀo r ti sc h o s e nw i t hh i g h
probability.
5 When Should the Agent Work Hard?
In this section, we determine loose parameters regions where the principal wants the
agent to exert the high level of eﬀort with strictly positive probability. That is we
characterize some situations where either V0 >m a x {V1,V µ} or where min{V1,V µ} >V 0.
The parameters we are mostly interested in are the net gain from being in the good rather
than the bad state, ∆ and the cost of exerting the high eﬀort suﬀered by the agent Ψ.
15Note here that once we know that V0 >m a x {V1,V µ} or that min{V1,V µ} >V 0,t h e o r e m
1 applies so that we can ﬁnd regions where V1 >V µ or where V1 <V µ.
It is easy to see (the proofs are provided in the Appendix) that if ∆ is very small, the
principal will not be willing to give any incentive for the agent to work hard. Furthermore,
if the cost Ψ of hard work is very high, then once again the principal will not give any
incentive for hard work. Intuitively, if the cost of hard work is too high, it will be too
expensive for the principal to elicit eﬀort and she will choose not to do it. To summarize,
we have min{V1,V µ} >V 0 for ∆ high enough or for Ψ small enough. V0 >V 1 and, for
any ε > 0, Vµ − V0 < ε otherwise.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we proposed an explanation of why we observe both indexed and nominal
contract. We modiﬁed a principal-agent model proposed by Jovanovic-Ueda (1997), with
moral hazard, renegotiation and where a signal (the nominal value of the sales of the
agent) is observed before renegotiation takes place. Our model relaxes an assumption
made by JU that agents choose pure strategies. We are able to show that their expla-
nation for the occurrence of nominal contract is robust to this change since, for some
parameters, the optimal contract is nominal in our model. We also show that, for other
parameters, the optimal contract is indexed.
In order to keep the analysis tractable, we have chosen to consider a very simple
model where the agent can choose a high or a low level of eﬀort, the signal can only take
two values, as can the real amount of sales of the agent. However, we do not believe that
our results would be substantially altered by considering a more general setup.
We proved that, according to this theory, contracts should be indexed when the
signal is not very informative and nominal otherwise. Since the signal, in this model,
is the nominal value of the sale of the agent, it will not be very informative when the
prices are diﬃcult to forecast. Our result is consistent with empirical regularities, ﬁrst
higher inﬂation makes prices more diﬃcult to forecast and, second, countries having
high inﬂation tend to have indexed contracts. The theory thus suggests that because the
signal will be less informative in countries with high inﬂation, they will choose to have
16indexed contracts. Similarly, in countries where inﬂation is low, the signal will carry
enough information and the contracts will be nominal.
177 Appendix
In this Appendix, for convenience, we let Φ(U) be the inverse function corresponding to
U,s u c ht h a tΦ(U (w)) = w,a l lw ∈ I R.
7.1 Constraints for the problem of the principal
(IC) Fe(H)[g(yH|H,e)U(yH,H,e)+g(yL|H,e)U(yL,H,e)]





+ Fe(L)[g(yH|L,e)U(yH,L,e)+g(yL|L,e)U(yL,L,e)] − Ψ(e) ≥ u
(7.2)
(BR) µ(e) ∈ argmax
µ{Fe(H)[g(yH|H,e)U(yH,H,e)+g(yL|H,e)U(yL,H,e)]
+Fe(L)[g(yH|L,e)U(yH,L,e)+g(yL|L,e)U(yL,L,e)] − Ψ(e)}













































Hence, the principal will just maximize his objective function with respect to Z.B e -
cause the solution to Fudenberg and Tirole problem is valid only if U(s,g,e) ≥ U(s,b,e),
we are able to obtain - using the above equalities - a lower and an upper bound on Z.
Let UB and LB be respectively the upper and lower bound on Z.T h e ya r ed e ﬁned by:
U(yH,L,e)(LB)=U(yL,L,e)(LB)
U(yH,H,e)(UB)=U(yL,H,e)(UB)


















Therefore, we have that µ(Z) < 1, for all Z ∈ [LB,UB]. Hence, if the principal
decides to set the mixing probability strictly between (0,1), the problem the principal
19faces is the following:
Max
LB≤Z≤UB
µ(Z){g(yH|e)yH +( 1 − g(yH|e))yHL
− Fe(H)[g(yH|H,e)Φ(U(yH,H,e)(Z)) + g(yL|H,e)Φ(U(yL,H,e)(Z))]
−Fe(L)[g(yH|L,e)Φ(U(yH,L,e)(Z)) + g(yL|L,e)Φ(U(yL,L,e)(Z))]}
+(1 − µ(Z)){g(yH|e)yH +( 1 − g(yH|e))yL − Φ(u)]}
subject to:
µ(Z)=min{µH(Z),µ L(Z)}
There exists a solution to this problem as we maximize a continuous function over a
compact set.
7.3 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.2.
We can rewrite W1 as
W1 = Fe(H)Φ(U(H)) + (1 − Fe(H))Φ(U(L))
+[Fe(H) − Fe(H)][U(H) − U(L)].
We know that [Fe(H) − Fe(H)][U(H) − U(L)] is non-negative and will show that Γ ≡
Fe(H)Φ(U(H)) + (1 − Fe(H))Φ(U(L)) goes to inﬁnity as Fe(H) −→ Fe(H).F i r s tn o t e






















2 [Fe(H)(1 − Fe(H))][Φ
0(U(L)) − Φ
0(U(H))] < 0.
The last inequality holds by convexity of Φ and the fact that U(H) >U (L).A l s o ,b y
assumption, Fe(H) >F e(H) so as Fe(H) decreases, Γ increases at an increasing rate and
tends to inﬁnity.
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Proof of Lemma 3.4.
F r o mt h ee x p r e s s i o n sg i v e na b o v e ,w eh a v et h a t
Vµ − V0 = µ[w + ∆(g(yH|e) − g(yH|e)) − Wµ].
The proof follows since Wµ ≥ 0 and w + ∆(g(yH|e) − g(yH|e)) is independent of µ.
¤
Proof of Lemma 3.5.
We can write
V1 − V0 = ∆[g(yH|e) − g(yH|e)] + w − W1.
Notice that W1 is independent of ∆. The lemma holds as g(yH|e) >g (yH|e).
¤
Proof of Theorem 4.1.
(1) By lemma 3.2, W1 −→ ∞ as Fe(H) −→ Fe(H). Our assumptions guarantee that Wµ
is bounded so that for Fe(H) − Fe(H) small enough, Vµ >V 1.
(2) By lemma 3.5 we can choose ∆ big enough so that V δ
1 (P0) >V 0 holds. As g(yH|H,e) →
g(yH|H,e), U(yH,H,e) →∞and U(yL,H,e) →− ∞ . Therefore, given Φ0 > 0 and
Φ00 > 0,w eh a v et h a tΦ0(U(yH,H,e)) − Φ0(U(yL,H,e)) →∞ .H e n c e , µH(Z) → 0,
for all Z, and since µ = min{µH(Z),µ L(Z)}, we have that µ(Z) −→ 0 for all Z.L e t
ε =( V1(δ) − V0)/2.F r o m l e m m a 3 . 4 w e k n o w t h a t a s µ −→ 0, Vµ − V0 < ε,s ot h a t
V1 >V µ.
¤
7.4 Comparative statics with respect to ∆ and Ψ
In this appendix, we derive some of the intuitive results formally.
We have already proved that if ∆ is big enough, V1 >V 0 and Vµ >V 0.W ea l s oh a v e :
Claim: There exists ∆ > 0 small enough such that V0 >V 1 and V0 >V µ.
21Proof. Setting ∆ =0 , we see that the claim holds. By continuity, and because W1 and
Wµ are independent of ∆, the claim will hold for suﬃciently small ∆ > 0.
Claim: There exists Ψ > 0 small enough such that V1 >V 0 and Vµ >V 0.
Proof. As Ψ −→ 0,w eh a v et h a tU(H) and U(L) tend to U,s u c ht h a tW1 −→ W0.S i n c e
g(yH|e) >g (yH|e),t h e r ei saΨ low enough such that V1 >V 0. Similarly, for Vµ >V 0.
Note that with Ψ =0 , the principal will always choose µ = 1.B u t e v e n f o r s m a l l
Ψ > 0, depending on the probabilities, it may be true that Vµ >V 1.
Claim: There exists Ψ > 0 large enough such that V0 >V 1 and, for any ε > 0,
Vµ − V0 < ε.
Proof. We have V1−V0 = ∆[g(yH|e) − g(yH|e)]+Φ(u)−W1. The wage bill W1 increases
unboundedly with Ψ and thus for Ψ large enough, V0 >V 1.
Also, Vµ − V0 = µ[Φ(u)+∆(g(yH|e) − g(yH|e)) − Wµ].A s Ψ increases, Wµ increases
and µ decreases to zero.
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